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THE NEW ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: JUDICIAL
SANCTION FOR AGENCY SELF-DETERMINATION
IN THE REGULATION OF INDUSTRY
RALPH F. FUCHS*
I. THE NEW CHARTER
Two decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the 1967-68 Term,
enlarging a trend which has been developing for some time, create a new basis
for expanding the methods by which federal regulatory agencies may meet
new problems. This foundation for extending authority and adapting administrative processes to new uses involves a major realignment of judicial, agency,
and legislative authority. It sanctions not merely the extension of existing
rules and methods to related areas, but also significant procedural innovations.
The agency operations which result, although they continue to have a statutory basis, may range considerably beyond those which the mandate of
existing legislation can accommodate comfortably.
The two decisions are those in the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,1
sustaining Federal Power Commission orders which regulate the prices and
price practices of many independent natural gas producers and United States
v. Southwestern Cable Co.,2 involving the Federal Communications Commission's regulation of CATV systems. The Permian Basin decision builds on
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin3 and a line of intervening decisions;
Southwestern Cable draws on Permian Basin for part of its rationale. Both
decisions derive additional support from recent decisions sustaining the expanded use of agency rule-making instead of adjudication in the interest of
effective enforcement ;4 but they increase the variety and scope of permissible
innovation.
II. THE

INSTANT CASES

In the Phillips Petroleum decision of 19545 the Supreme Court imposed
on a reluctant Federal Power Commission the task of regulating sales of
natural gas in interstate commerce by independent producers. It construed
the Natural Gas Act to cover these sales, although the dominant construction
of the statute, to which the Commission had adhered, was that they were not
included. The opinion of the 5-3 majority of the Court relied primarily
* University Professor of Law, Indiana University.

1. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
2. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
3. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
4. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adiudication in the Development of
Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. REv. 921 (1965); Fuchs, Agency Development of
Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U.L. IEv. 781 (1965).
5. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
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upon the literal meaning of certain words of the Act; but the more significant
reason for the decision, it seems fair to say, was the consumer or "public" interest in reasonable natural gas prices which underlay the statute. Absent
regulation, increasing demand might have continuously driven up prices beyond the point needed to sustain successful discovery, production, and gather8
ing of the gas. The Court has alluded to these considerations in later opinions.
When the Commission turned to carrying out the Court's mandate, it
made resourceful use of the rule-making, licensing and rate-fixing powers
which the Natural Gas Act conferred for the regulation of a relatively small
number of pipelines, laboring "with obvious difficulty to regulate a diverse
and growing industry under the terms of an ill-suited statute."'7 Especially
important among the powers employed were the authority to attach conditions
to certificates of convenience and necessity for new production," the power "to
prescribe

. . .

such ...

regulations as it [the Commission] may find necessary

or appropriate to carry out the provisions" of the statute, 9 and the authority
to combine several rate- or price-fixing proceedings into one group proceeding.
Other agencies had developed this group procedure which presumably was
available to the Commission in connection with its obligation to determine just
0
and reasonable rates.'
Significant use of these powers in connection with the issuance of certificates followed the Supreme Court's decision in the Atlantic Refining case."
This decision declared it to be the Federal Power Commission's duty to consider limiting the initial prices at which gas might be sold until just and reasonable rates might be determined in later proceedings. The Commission
carried out this mandate in several ways. (1) It adopted a regulation, based
on a rule-making proceeding in accordance with Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 1 2 which proscribed certain kinds of price-increase or
escalation clauses in contracts between producers and purchasers of gas. Applications accompanied by contracts which contained such clauses would not
be considered. 13 (2) It issued a Statement of General Policy,' 4 without prior
proceedings, which established interim maximum prices to be charged in the
several producing areas of the country. These prices could be authorized under
6. In Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), which held
that price ceilings should be imposed on new production, the Court emphasized the
legislative purpose "to afford consumers a complete, permanent and effective bond of
protection from excessive rates and charges," 360 U.S. at 388, and the need to prevent
"a triggering of general price rises," id. at 391.
7. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 756 (1968).
8. Natural Gas Act § 6(e), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1964).

9. 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1964).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1964). The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in the

Permian Basin Cases refers to certain earlier instances of the use of the group technique.

390 U.S. at 831-32.
11. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
12. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. III 1968).

13. 18 C.F.R. § 154.93 (1968). See FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
14. 18 C.F.R. § 2.56 (1968).
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temporary certificates which new producers might accept pending consideration of their applications for permanent certificates.' 6 (3) The Commission
foreclosed statutory rate-increase filings for sales authorized by these certificates so long as they remained in effect. 6 (4) It conditioned permanent certificates upon the observance of maximum prices set by the Commission, 17 subject
to moratoria or restrictions on rate-increase filings, until specified dates or the
earlier determination of just and reasonable rates.' 8 (5) It decided to combine
the rate determinations incident to geographically related certificate filings, so
as to permit a single determination to be made for a group of producers or a
producing field, 19 and (6) provided that these prices would be determined on
the basis of prices previously in effect and on related market factors, instead
of on producers' costs and needs. 20
Producers subject to the price limitations that were effectuated by these
expedients could not withdraw from their commitments to sell gas upon the
prescribed terms once they had made the choice of accepting temporary or
permanent certificates. 21 Certain procedures set forth in the statute or traditionally followed for the certification and regulation of gas sales became inoperative. These were (1) an adjudicatory hearing upon an application for a
certificate, when the certificate was accompanied by a proposal for a proscribed price-increase clause;22 (2) opportunity for a seller to file a price
increase permitted by his contract with a buyer or buyers, subject to the Commission's suspension, hearing, and refund procedures, when a price ceiling or
moratorium on price increases applied;23 and (3) evidence and decision on
the authorization of new prices, focusing on the individual producing enter24
prise.
Since the measures adopted by the Commission, except the proscription
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1964). The producer's option of rejecting a temporary
certificate and awaiting a decision on a permanent one led the Federal Power Commission
in amending the Statement in 1965 to describe it as one not imposing a course of conduct
on anyone, but as merely setting forth the Commission's own "contemplated course of
action" for the guidance of its staff and the public. 30 Fed. Reg. 4671 (1965).
16. Sections 4(d) and (e) of the Natural Gas Act authorize any natural gas company transporting or selling natural gas in interstate commerce to file new rates with the
Federal Power Commission. These take effect in 30 days unless suspended by the Commission for not more than 5 months in addition. If the new rates are not acted upon
by the Commission within that time, they may then take effect, subject to possible refunds
to the extent they are later found to be too high. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717f(d), (e) (1964). As
to the Commission's authority to suspend the privilege to make such filings under temporary certificates, see FPC v. Hunt, 376 U.S. 515 (1964).
17. See United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc., 382 U.S. 223 (1965).
18. Id.; Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 780 (1968).
19. See FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9, 26-36 (1968) ; United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc., 382 U.S. 223, 226 (1965).
20. See United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc., 382 U.S. 223, 226-28

(1965).
21. See FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9, 44-47 (1968).
22. See FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
23. See note 16 supra.

24. See United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc., 382 U.S. 223, 226-28

(1965).
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of price escalation clauses, were temporary, applicable only until more permanent terms to govern certification and prices could be promulgated, this suspension of statutory procedures seemed less serious than it might have if
permanent departures from the statutory processes had been contemplated.
However, because of delay in the establishment of more permanent controls,
these temporary measures have regulated the industry for many years, on a
scale which has been graphically portrayed. 25 Rightly or wrongly, judicial extension of the Natural Gas Act by the Phillipsdecision has led to the development by the Commission and the courts of complicated measures of control in
which the legislature has played no active part.26 Although producers could
have avoided these measures by refraining from sales of gas in interstate commerce until more permanent controls were established, such an option is often
economically unrealistic, and the historical development of the control measures has been such that much production has been irrevocably committed
27
before the full development has occurred or become known.
As these regulatory measures were being developed, the Federal Power
Commission inaugurated its area rate proceedings, aimed at the determination
of reasonable rates for substantially all of the independent producers2 8 in each
of the major natural gas producing areas of the country. The Permian Basin
proceeding, the first begun and for three years the only one concluded, was
launched on December 23, 1960, to cover an area defined in the initiating
order. 29 Rate proceedings involving a large number of established producers
and a limited number of applications for certificates were consolidated in it,
and a substantial number of intervenors who possessed a requisite interest in
the outcome, including states and state agencies, municipalities, and trade
groups, were admitted.30 The proceeding lasted more than four and one-half
years, including two years of hearings, and produced more than 30,000 pages
25. Brown, J., in Hunt v. FPC, 306 F.2d 334, 343 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 515
(1964).

26. Two bills to change the situation created by the Phillips decision were stopped

only by presidential veto. See notes 147-54 infra and accompanying text. For illuminating

accounts of these developments and of the emergence of many of the problems discussed
infra see Johnson, Producer Rate Regulation in Natural Gas Certification Proceedings:
CATCO in Context, 62 CoLum. L. Rxv. 773 (1962); Ross, The Area Rate Proceedings:
An, Unsettled Experiment in Public Control of Natural Gas Prices,18 Sw. L.J. 165 (1964) ;
Scott, Federal Certificate Regulation of Producer Gas Sales: Initial Rates and Related
Problents, 18 Sw. L.J. 570, 682-93 (1964) ; Note, The FPC and Indefinite Price Escalation
Clauses: Remedy for Administrative Breakdown, 73 YA E LJ. 1283 (1964).
27. Some production was committed under temporary certificates without knowledge
that price increases during the continuance of these certificates might be barred. See Hunt
v. FPC, 306 F.2d 334, 336-38 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 515 (1964). It apparently
was not known until the decision in Public Service Comm'n v. FPC, 329 F.2d 242, 248-50
(1964), that prices charged under temporary certificates which made no provision for
refunds might turn out to have been accompanied by a refund obligation. FPC v. Sunray
DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9, 40-45 (1968).
28. An independent producer is one that is not part of a regulated pipeline enterprise.
29. 24 F.P.C. 1121 (1960).
30. Area Rate Proceeding, 34 F.P.C. 159, 171, 407-17 (1965). The total number of
parties was 384, including 336 producers and applicants for certificates.
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of transcript.31 At its conclusion the Commission issued orders which (1) established reasonable maximum rates within the area, varying somewhat geographically and differentiating between gas-well gas committed to interstate
sale on or after January 1, 1961, and gas-well gas committed before that date
together with all gas produced in conjunction with oil; (2) provided adjustments for quality of gas; (3) required refunds under Section 4(e) of the Act
from producers whose challenged rate increases had been found to be excessive; (4) established a moratorium on rate increases until January 1, 1968;
(5) extended the proscription of certain rate-increase clauses, which applied
to contracts after its date,3 2 to prevent increases under earlier contracts beyond
the rates permitted in the order ;33 (6) granted certificates to the applicants
who were parties to the proceeding, conditioned as to rates and rate increases
in conformity to the principal order ;34 (7) issued an order to show cause why
the same rates should not be prescribed for existing production and production
covered by pending applications of producers not previously party to the proceeding;35 (8) exempted small producers, defined as those whose national
production is less than ten billion cubic feet of gas a year, from downward
quality adjustments of their prices for refund purposes, and initiated rulemaking procedures to exempt them from certain application, price-filing, and
reporting requirements of the Act and regulations ;36 and (9) preserved opportunity for individual respondents to seek exemption from the moratorium on
37
price increases and from other restrictions imposed by the orders.
The Permian Basin orders and the Supreme Court decision confirming
them add to the previous extra-statutory aspects of independent gas producer
regulation in two important ways which possess enhanced significance because
they affect permanent rate determinations and not merely interim restrictions.
They are (1) the moratorium which temporarily withdrew, except in instances
of special justification, the privilege of securing Commission consideration of
rate increases under Section 4(e) of the Act, and (2) the use of average cost
figures in establishing uniform rates for many producers at one time, subject
to possible individual relief upon petition. The determination of individual
exemptions upon petition might consume long periods of time. Interim relief
(such as Section 4(e) provides by permitting increased rates to be collected,
subject to possible refunds, after six months from their communication to the
Commission) would not be available. Hence the moratorium, like the original
31. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 755 n.4 (1968).
32. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
33. Principal order, 34 F.P.C. 239-43 (1965).
34. Order Issuing Certificates, 34 F.P.C. 418-24 (1965).
35. Order to Show Cause, 34 F.P.C. 424-34 (1968).
36. 34 F.P.C. at 234-36, 241
(F) (3); id. at 434-37 (1968). On a national basis
only about 75 major companies would not be small producers and would remain subject
to the Federal Power Commission's full requirements under the Natural Gas Act. Id. at
235.

37. 34 F.P.C. at 242 ff (H), 243 1111
(K), (L), 423 1 (K).
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regulation proscribing without hearings on certificate applications certain rateincrease clauses, withholds particular procedures seemingly secured by the
statute. The average-cost basis of rate determination departs in a fundamental
way from the previous common understanding of legal requirements in the
fixation of "just and reasonable" rates, as Mr. Justice Douglas stressed in his
Permian Basin dissent.3 8 The legislature, again, has not played an affirmative
role in fashioning these significant new processes.
In the Southwestern Cable39 case the order which the Supreme Court
sustained resulted from the Federal Communications Commission's initiative
in meeting new needs created by advancing technology. The Communications
Act, administered by the Commission, confers specific powers to regulate common carriers of communications on the one hand 40 and the transmission of
energy, communications, and signals by radio, including broadcasting, on the
other.4 1 Community antenna television systems began in 1950. They disseminate a variety of selected television programs by wire, within limited geographical areas, to paying subscribers. The television picture which results
from these methods is of superior quality. The systems obtain some of their
programs from the broadcasts of distant stations, and transmit them or
arrange to have them transmitted by microwave or wire to the localities where
they are distributed. The CATV systems neither hold themselves out as Common carriers nor engage in radio transmission, except where they supply
microwave transmissions to their own systems. Nevertheless, the entire scheme
of broadcast regulation conferring exclusive local use of designated radio frequencies on enterprises licensed by the Commission,42 is economically dislocated by competition from program services which do not depend on similar
authorization. One of the Commission's statutory goals in apportioning scarce
broadcasting frequencies has been to maintain economically viabfe enterprises,
43
able and willing to render adequate, locally oriented public service.
The Commission commenced to regulate CATV under the existing statute after Congress failed to respond to proposals for new legislation.44 In 1965,
under its general rule-making power,4 5 it adopted regulations for CATV em38. 390 U.S. at 829.
39. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
40. These are contained inTitle II of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1964).
41. Title III of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1964).

42. The statute directs that in allocating radio frequencies and administering the
standard of public convenience and necessity, which governs the granting of licenses, the
Commission shall seek to "provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio
service" to each state and community, and may require information from broadcasting
license applicants as to their character and financial, technical, and other qualifications to
operate stations. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), (b), 308(b) (1964).
43. W. K. JONES, LIcENSING OF MAJOR BROADCAST FAcITIES BY THE FEDERAL
COmmUNIcATmONs Com issiro (Report to the Administrative Conference of the United
States, 1962), 43-44, 51-64; Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 698-701
(1965). The Supreme Court's opinion in the Southwestern Cable case summarizes the

development of CATV regulation. 392 U.S. 157, 164-67 (1968).
45. 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 303(f), (r) (1964).
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ploying microwave. 46 These were modified and supplemented in 196647 to
provide more complete regulation for both microwave and wire CATV. The
resulting rules 48 require community antenna television systems to make available to their subscribers the programs of local broadcasters 49 and upon request
to display the same programs from other locations only after a one-day delay.50
The regulations also provide that in the 100 largest television markets of the
country the CATV systems may not import programs from outside, in the
absence of certain "grandfather" rights, unless the Commission, after "a full
evidentiary hearing," authorizes this service as "consistent with the public
interest . . . particularly the establishment and healthy maintenance of television broadcast service in the area." 51 The regulations also authorize applications to be made for "separate or additional relief" in relation to CATV
matters, and provide variable procedures by which the Commission will entertain and dispose of such applications. These procedures involve informal
written applications and responses, followed when necessary by such "other
procedures, such as oral argument, evidentiary hearing, or further written
submissions," as the Commission may deem appropriate. 2
The authority for these regulations and the validity of a Commission
order implementing them were examined by the Supreme Court as a result
of a San Diego television broadcaster's request for relief from CATV operations of the Southwestern Cable Company, which transmitted programs originating in Los Angeles to subscribers in San Diego. The Commission, pending
hearings which it initiated, restricted somewhat Southern's CATV service by
means of an interim order. In respondent's proceeding for review, the Supreme
Court sustained this interim order and the Commission's authority to regulate
CATV. It dealt of necessity with the nature of the regulations but did not pass
directly on their validity.5 3 However, particular provisions have been sustained
by courts of appeals. 4
The Court, in part, found authority in Section 2(a) of the Act 5 for the
46. 30 Fed. Reg. 6060-63, 13370-75 (1965). These regulations operated by attaching
conditions to the Commission's authorization of the transmissions, limiting the use that
might be made of microwave signals by CATV systems receiving them.
47. 31 Fed. Reg. 4568-73 (1966).
48. 47 C.F.R. §§ 21.710-21.714 (common-carrier microwave service to CATV systems) ; 74.1001-74.1083 (CATV-owned microwave transmission); 74.1101-74.1109 (operation of CATV systems); 91.557-91.561 (independent microwave service to CATV
systems) (1968).
49. Id. §§ 21.712, 74.1033, 74.1103, 91.559.
50. Id.
51. Id. §§ 74.1105-74.1107.
52. Id. § 74.1109. Applications may be by interested persons, such as CATV or
microwave operators seeking waivers of rules and broadcasters or others seeking additional action or the resolution of disputes.
53. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 167 (1968).
54. Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968) ; Conley Electronics
Corp. v. FCC, 394 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1968) ; Wheeling Antenna Co. v. United States, 391
F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1968) ; Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 385 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.
1967) ; Channel 9 Syracuse, Inc. v. FCC, 385 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
55. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1964).
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regulations the Commission had adopted and for the order restricting the respondent. This introductory Section states that
[t]he provisions of this Act shall apply to all interstate and foreign
communication by wire or radio and all interstate and foreign transmission of energy by radio, which originates and/or is received within
the United States, and to all persons engaged within the United
States in such communication or such transmission of energy by
radio, and to the licensing and regulating of all radio stations as
hereinafter provided ....
Community antenna television systems conduct "interstate ...communication
by wire or radio." By its terms, the quoted provision extends the authority
of the Commission as it is spelled out elsewhere in the Act to CATV systems.
The Court, however, speaks of the section as extending the "regulatory authority" of the Commission, apparently in the sense of a broad power to
achieve the purposes of the statute.50
The Commission has the statutory power, contained in Title III of the
Act, relating to radio, to issue "such rules and regulations and prescribe such
restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this chapter. .. ,,15
It also has the power, contained
in the general Title, to "perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be
necessary in the execution" of the functions of the Commission. 58 The Commission's order against the Southwestern Cable Company came within the
second of these two powers if it can be construed as a grant of authority which
embraces a "function," bestowed by Section 2(a), of regulating "all forms of
communication by wire or radio." The regulations authorizing the proceeding
that led to the order came within both powers if the former embraces wire in
addition to radio communication, as literally it does, and if Section 2(a) is a
"provision" which authorizes the regulation of CATV.
By construing these three sections of the statute broadly in relation to
each other,5 9 the Court established a scope of agency authority significantly
greater than the terms of each provision appear to bestow. Section 2(a), broad
as to subject matter, depends by its terms on other provisions of the Act. The
other two provisions, which authorize a broad range of implementing mea56. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172-73 (1968).
57. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1964). See 392 U.S. at 178. The same section of the Act

as originally enacted in 1934 contains another paragraph to the same effect, from which
the Court cites only the qualified authority it bestows to adopt regulations to prevent
interference among broadcasting stations. 392 U.S. at 174. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(f), (h)
(1964). The Commission itself cited § 303 as a whole in support of its authority to adopt
the CATV regulations. Rules re Microwave-served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 741 (1965);
CATV Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C. 2d 725, 788 (1966), but stressed § 303(r) in
its 1966 statement just cited. See also Appendix C to CATV Second Report and Order,
(Commission's Memorandum on Its Jurisdiction and Authority), 2 F.C.C2d 793, 794.

58. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1964).
59. 392 U.S. at 167-69, 171-75, 177-78, 180-81.
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sures, are to aid in carrying out the powers conferred elsewhere in the statute.
The result of combining them is that the Commission is authorized, when
necessary to carry out its total mission as visualized by it and by the courts,
to adopt a wide variety of means to regulate unspecified aspects of communications, in contrast to the defined means which the statute provides for regulating specified portions of the communications industry.0°
The opinion of the Court stresses that "[n]othing in the language of
[Section 2(a)], in the surrounding language, or in the Act's history or purposes limits the Commission's authority to those activities and forms of communications that are specifically described by the Act's other provisions," 0'
and that the Commission has "'a comprehensive mandate'," with "'not niggardly but expansive powers',"6 2 to carry out its task. The Court also repeats
its pronouncement in the PermianBasin case that "we may not, 'in the absence
of compelling evidence that such was Congress' intention ... prohibit administrative action imperative for the achievement of an agency's ultimate purposes.'" "There is," it holds, "no such evidence here . ... "03 This view of
agency powers typically sanctions new methods authorized only generally by
statute of dealing effectively with activities within the scope of agency authority; here, the Court's sweeping interpretation of Section 2(a) justifies innovative methods for regulating new segments of an industry, such as CATV,
which, although not specified in the statute, are thought to fall within its
purpose.

III.

BREADTH OF THE CHARTER

Despite the breadth of the foregoing view of the Court, the principle of
semi-autonomous, expandible agency authority is not without limits. The extension of Federal Power Commission authority to independent natural gas
producers embraced transactions which were closely related in an economic
sense to the regulatory task previously assigned by Congress. In the Southwestern Cable opinion the Court took occasion "to emphasize that the authority
which we recognize today ... is restricted to that reasonably ancilliary to the
effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the
regulation of television broadcasting."0 4 The Court expressed "no views as to
the Commission's authority, if any, to regulate CATV under any other cir60. Title II of the Communications Act, relating to carriers, bestows the usual range of
authority over public utilities with respect to entry, rates, services, accounts, and mergers.
Title III relating to radio relates mainly to allocation of use of the spectrum, licensing,
enforcement of certain requirements for broadcasters, and administration of technical
standards.
61. 392 U.S. at 172 (1968).

62. Id. at 173, citing National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219

(1943).
63. 392 U.S. at 177-78, citng 390 U.S. at 780.
64. Id. at 178.
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cumstances or for any other purposes."65 Ancillarity may be broadly or narrowly construed according to a practical judgment of need in the performance
of an agency's principal tasks and a sense of the relative importance of countervailing considerations. Although the language of the Communications Act on
which the Court relied does not expressly restrict the scope of the Commission's function in relation to wire and radio communication and radio transmission, appropriate limits are implicit in the nature of the task to-be
performed. Attempts to regulate private communication by private wire,
having no impact on common carriers, might not be acceptable.
Procedurally, the measures devised by an agency and sanctioned by the
courts must obviously conform to the requirements of due process of law. The
Court suggested a further possible limitation where an attempt is made to
supplant a statutory proceeding for the performance of an established function. Answering an objection that the order against the Southwestern Cable
Company was based on freer procedures than the statute authorizes for those
cease and desist orders which it specifically sanctions,66 the court was willing
to "assume that" statutory cease and desist orders against violators of the Act
"are proper only after hearing or waiver of the right to hearing." In the San
Diego CATV matter relief was sought against previously authorized conduct,
not against a violation, and the cease and desist order provision of the Act did
not apply. If it had applied, the statutory procedure might have been mandatory.67 This procedural restriction on the Commission is of narrow and somewhat uncertain scope. It does not apply when regulations prescribe procedures
for new functions not explicitly covered by the statute, as was true in the
Southwestern Cable case itself. Even where a function, such as cease and desist orders, is subject to express statutory procedures, the Court has been
willing to approve regulations authorized only in general terms and based on
a different procedure, which displaced the statutory function and processes
by settling a decisive issue in advance, as did the regulation proscribing certain
kinds of natural gas price increase clauses in the Texaco case.68 It is far from
certain, consequently, that the Court might not, where practical needs were
met, approve a regulation that established a different procedure for performing
a statutory function in toto.
Practicalities have supported the decisions of the federal courts in the
growing number of recent cases, including Texaco, which have upheld the dis65. Id.
66. Id. at 179.
67. The Federal Communications Commission proposes to use its cease and desist
order authority, 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1964), to enforce its rules applicable to CATV systems that do not use microwave and are therefore not dependent on licenses. CATV
Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C. 2d 725, 766 (1966). In this connection it presumably
will follow the procedure prescribed in 47 U.S.C. § 312(c) (1964). The cease and desist
sanction applies to all violations of regulations and of license restrictions, as well as of
the statute itself.
68. FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
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placement of agency adjudicative processes by rule-making authorized only
by a general power to adopt regulations. In several instances the number of
decisions to be made has required that certain issues be settled across the board
rather than case by case, lest "the administrative heavens fall" and agencies
be deprived "of ability to administer."69 Air Line Pilots Association, International v. Quesada7" involved a regulation of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator establishing an age-limit of 60 for pilots operating commercial passenger
planes. It in effect abridged the outstanding licenses of pilots, which under the
Civil Aeronautics Act could be modified in individual instances only after
opportunity for a full-scale hearing and judicial review. The court, in sustaining the regulation, pointed to procedural and substantive reasons why an agelimit rule served the statutory purpose of safety in aviation better than a series
of adjudications to determine the continued fitness of individual pilots. In
California Citizens Band Association v. United States7 - a regulation altering
the permissible uses of some 800,000 citizens-band radio licenses was sustained
for similar reasons. In WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 72 where the challenged
regulations altered the range and effectiveness of the broadcasting of hundreds
of commercial radio stations, the court applied the same reasoning; but in that
case, as well, the Federal Communications Commission exercised a specific
rule-making power to assign frequencies to classes of stations and regulate
the manner of their use. 73
The leading Supreme Court case on the foregoing point before Texaco,
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 4 which sustained a regulation that
limited the number of broadcasting stations a single licensee might own, did
not involve a need to avoid many adjudicative proceedings. Neither did several
recent court of appeals cases in the same series.76 In all these instances, however, the policy embodied in new regulations was "based upon the general
characteristics of an industry"76 which could rationally and efficiently be appraised in an agency rule-making proceeding. As a result of this development
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was able to
refer to the "solidly established tradition" of the Texaco and other cases.
69. WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 617 (2d Cir. 1968).
70. 276 F.2d 892 (1961). See also 286 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962

(1961).
71. 375 F.2d 43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844 (1967).
72. 396 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1968).
73. 396 F.2d at 614.
74. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
75. American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 365 F.2d 939 (D.C.Cir. 1966); American Airlines, Inc. v.CAB,359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966); Capitol
Airways, Inc. v.CAB, 292 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Western Pacific R.R. v.Habermeyer, 382 F.2d 1003, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 980 (1968) ("The
receiving, processing and granting or denying of claims for benefits iswholesale business."). See also United Transports, Inc. v. United States, 245 F.Supp. 561 (W.D. Okla.
1965), aff'd, 383 U.S. 411 (1966); Motor Convoy, Inc. v.United States, 235 F. Supp.

250 (N.D. Ga. 1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 436 (1965). Compare Movers Conference of
America v.United States, 205 F. Supp.82 (S.D. Cal. 1962), with Movers Conference of
America v.United States, 251 F. Supp. 882 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
76. WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, (2d Cir. 1968).
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Under this "tradition" a general agency power to adopt regulations, which in
an earlier view was generally regarded as authorizing only procedural and
internal regulations, 77 is now looked upon as empowering an agency to issue
substantive rules having legal force against outsiders, even when the effect is
to foreclose procedures otherwise secured by statute.7 8 Past zealousness to
guard a licensee from having his license modified by rules when the statute
required a hearing79 has only a lingering force. 80
The provision of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act which affords
interested persons an opportunity to submit to an agency data and views concerning proposed regulations"' encourages agencies to use, and courts to sustain, rule-making, even when the resulting regulations have a severe impact 2
or supersede adjudicatory processes. The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia has noted the change from pre-APA circumstances,8 3
and the Supreme Court 4 and lower federal courts8 5 have stressed the adequacy of APA rule-making processes as a means of enabling affected persons
to vindicate their interests. Also important in securing procedural fairness are
the continued availability of processes to seek amendments to regulations88 or,
under many agency rules of practice, exemptions from them in individual instances.8 7 Both these means of securing dispensation from distasteful regulations were present in the Storer Broadcasting s and Texaco cases.8 9 It
remains true, however, that all of these proceedings combined do not secure
the same procedural rights as the forms of adjudication specified in the APA.
Rule-making proceedings may be limited to written submissions; in them the
77. Lee, Legislative and Interpretative Regulations, 29 GEo. L.J. 1, 29 (1940).
78. Pacific Coast European Conference v. FMC, 376 F.2d 785, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
79. Campbell v. Long & Co., 281 U.S. 610 (1930); Campbell v. Galeno Chemical Co.,
281 U.S. 599 (1930). See also L. B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 170 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1948);
FCC v. National Broadcasting Co. (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943). Even in this view, the
regulation remains valid with relation to licenses that issue after it takes effect. Goodwill
Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 325 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; Transcontinent Television Corp. v.
FCC, 308 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
80. Cf. American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en
banc) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
81. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. III 1968).
82. American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953) ; Brooks Gas
Corp. v. FPC, 383 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ; Borden Co. v. Freeman, 256 F. Supp. 592
(D.N.J.), aff'd per curiant, 369 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 992 (1967) ;
Air Dispatch, Inc. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 450 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 381 U.S.
412 (1965).
83. Transcontinent Television Corp. v. FCC, 308 F.2d 339, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
84. FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 40 (1964) ; United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956).
85. WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1968) ; California Citizens
Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v.
Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961).
86. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (Supp. III 1968) requires each agency to "give an interested
person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule."
87. The principal order in the Perinian,Basin Area Rate Cases and the CATV regulations of the FCC (see notes 44-63 supra and accompanying text) both preserved this
opportunity.
88. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956).
89. See FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1964).
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attention of the agency is focused on a general problem and not on the situation
of a particular party; persons to be affected may not have received notice of
the proceeding or may acquire an interest in the matters involved only later ;90
and in a subsequent proceeding to amend a" regulation or secure exemption
from it a heavy burden of proof or of persuasion will rest upon the applicant.
Representation by others similarly situated, rather than personal participation,
becomes the means of safeguarding the interests of many of those affected.
There is little need for concern about such reductions in the procedural
rights of interested persons as have been sanctioned to date by decisions sustaining the substitution of rule-making for adjudicative procedures.Y1 In each
instance the court noted that the parties protesting the change had been participants in the rule-making proceeding that was used. When the number of
potential adjudications was not so great as to threaten administrative paralysis
if all were attempted, the issue which was determined by regulation was of a
nature that made the rule-making procedure supportable. Three cases involving regulations of the Federal Maritime Commission are instructive. Two of
them involved regulations of the Commission which required certain provisions
in ocean shipping conference agreements. These cases related to membership
conditions and dealings with shippers, 92 as to which the relevant circumstances
would hardly vary significantly from conference to conference. The earliest
of the three cases dealt with regulations that outlawed certain kinds of dual90. See, e.g., The instance of nonappearance by the owners of certain small oil tankers
in proceedings to establish regulations for the construction of such vessels, which is mentioned in REPT. ATT'y GEN'S CoMM. ON ADMIN. PRoC. 114 (1941); Bigelow-Sanford
Carpet Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Blake v. United States, 295 F.2d 91
(4th Cir. 1961), involved oyster growers who were held bound by regulations forbidding
their markers in certain waters, which were adopted after proceedings that seemingly
were not brought to the attention of these growers. Cf. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952), in which the Supreme Court rejected a contention that a
regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, applicable to the transportation of
explosives by motor vehicles and enforceable by prosecution for violations, was impermissibly vague. The Court noted that "the trucking industry participated extensively"
in the rule-making process. Id. at 341-42. It is doubtless true that participation by the
truckers aided in making the regulation as definite as feasible; and the members of the
industry could have pressed through trade associations or otherwise for its later modification. The Court did not state whether the particular trucker charged with a violation
had taken part or been represented when the regulation was framed. There was no
contention that the Commission did not have power to adopt rules governing the transportation of explosives or that any procedural rights had been withheld.
91. See, however, the contrary argument in FitzGerald, Adoption of Federal Power
Commission Price-ChangingRules Without Evidentiary Hearing: Statutory Collision, 18
Sw. L.J. 236 (1964), with respect to the regulations later sustained by the Supreme Court
in the Texaco case. Professor FitzGerald points out that as to these regulations no evidentiary hearings had been held either in the rule-making proceedings or in prior adjudications involving the same issues; that the regulations, without specific statutory authorization, dealt with important business and property rights; and that the lack of an administrative record curtailed judicial review. The rule-making and judicial review processes
prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (Supp. III 1968?,
require no more. Whether such processes are adequate remains a matter for judgment in
each situation.
92. Outward Continental North Pac. Freight Conference v. FMC, 385 F.2d 981
(D.C. Cir. 1967); Pacific Coast European Conference v. FMC, 376 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir.
1967).
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rate provisions in conference agreements.9 3 Since the effects of this type of
provision on competition were the significant factors entering into Commission
policy, and since these effects might arguably vary for different shipping routes
and in relation to agreements of differing inclusiveness, a case could be made
that a uniform rule was unsuitable and that each conference should have full
procedural rights in connection with a determination that affected this aspect
of its operations. The legislative history made it clear, however, that Congress
intended to subject the matters involved in all three cases to determination by
regulation in the discretion of the Commission. Hence the issues that were
raised concerning the legal propriety of the use of rule-making did not seem
serious.9 4 Even as respects the dual-rate regulation, approximately 60 different
conference agreements were affected, and significant procedural economies
were achieved by substituting a single proceeding for the separate ones that
otherwise would have been required.9 5
Some kinds of questions are clearly susceptible to general determination
by means of rule-making, without regard to participation in the proceedings
by any particular affected persons. For example, the amount of residue of a
poisonous chemical spray to be permitted on a food product sold for human
consumption does not depend on who makes the chemical or sells the product.
The special stake of chemical manufacturers and of food handlers in the issue
is entirely subordinate and does not enable any of them to make a unique contribution to resolving it. By contrast, other kinds of determinations relate to
situations that differ from each other in relevant ways. The general factors
present are intertwined to such a degree with those dependent on each particular instance that judgments linking together each special situation with
the general context in which it arises are required. For example, whether a
corporate acquisition or merger may substantially lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly depends on the facts relating to the particular corporations involved and, at the same time, the circumstances existing in the industries and markets in which these corporations do business. If the statute
makes no explicit provision for the use of general rules in this kind of determination but rather provides for adjudication in each instance, the legislative
intention may well be that binding regulations to govern particular cases are
not authorized. This would be true even though there is a general statutory
provision permitting the agency to adopt regulations to carry out the act. The
age-limit for pilots kind of question falls between the poisonous residue and
corporate merger varieties of issues because the effects of age differ inherently
from person to person, but scarcely to a degree which requires that, for the
93. Pacific Coast European Conference v. United States, 350 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1965).
94. The conferences pointed out, however, that loss of previous approval of conference
agreements, not mere approval of new proposals, was involved.
95. 350 F.2d at 204.
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sake of realism and fairness, there be a determination in each case separately. 0
As to each such issue, if the statute under which it arises does not make clear
the procedures which may be employed, the agency and the reviewing courts
must decide as realistically and fairly as they can whether rule-making is
suitable.
The experience of the Federal Trade Commission with its recently established Trade Regulation Rules indicates the limits to an agency's use of general
rule-making powers in place of adjudicative processes specified in statutes.
The Commission has specific authority to issue legislative rules under certain
relatively narrow statutes which it administers. 97 The enforcement provisions
of the broader statutes administered by the Commission, the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts, specifically provide for enforcement only through
the issuance of cease and desist orders based on trial-type adjudicatory hearings. Under the Clayton Act, the Commission's enforcement powers are to be
exercised "[w]henever the Commission . . . shall have reason to believe that
any person is violating or has violated" the provisions of the Act which are
enforced by the Commission. 98 In such a case "it shall issue . . . a complaint
stating its charges in that respect, and containing a notice of a hearing .... .,11
Under the Federal Trade Commission Act the method of enforcement is the
same, but it is enjoined upon the Commission only when it believes that a
proceeding would be in the public interest.' 0 0 In addition the Commission
under this Act is given authority "to make rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions" of the Act. 1° 1
96. The problem here is not the same as determining the most appropriate procedure
for resolving particular issues of fact. That problem can be stated in terms of whether a
fact to be ascertained is "legislative" or "adjudicative"--i.e., general or related to a particular person or item of conduct. 1 K DAvis, ADMINISTRAVE LAW TREATISE § 7.02
(1958). The question then is which issues call for data and official notice and which
for direct evidence. Such issues as the effects of age on ability to perform certain
duties which an agency has authority to regulate are both general in nature and related
to facts which differ from case to case. They are within the qualification to the statement
that legislative facts "do not usually concern the immediate parties but are general facts
which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion." Id. at 413.
When the fact to be determined, like that of the effects of age on pilots, not only concerns
a party but may differ significantly in his case from the general norm (itself a conclusion
drawn from particulars), he may have strong reasons to urge that he is entitled to an
unprejudiced determination in his case separately, if the governing statute lends support
to this view. The issue for agency and court in deciding on his contention is whether to
make a norm decisive upon him (or at least difficult to overcome if exceptions to it are
left open), or whether to assume the burden of separate adjudications in his case and all
others like it. The resolution of this issue depends on considerations of administrative
feasibility as much as on the nature of the fact or facts to be determined.
97. These statutes are enumerated in the Commission's Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R.
§ 1.13, 1.14 (1968). They include the "quantity limit" provision of the Robinson-Patman
Act, amending § 2 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1964). Enforcement of the most important provisions of the
Clayton Act, § 2, 3, 7 and 8, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 18 and 19 (1964), is entrusted to other
agencies with respect to certain industries which these agencies regulate and to the
Federal Trade Commission with respect to all other aspects of interstate and foreign
commerce. 15 U.S. § 21(a) (1964).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1964).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1964). The Clayton Act does not confer a general rule-
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Under both principal acts the Federal Trade Commission made use from
an early time of so-called Trade Practice Conference Rules (each of which
covered a specific trade or industry and was formulated in conjunction with
the group concerned) to aid in securing conformity to the statutes and to desirable business conduct. The rules consisted both of guides to the law and of
' The rules containing statements as to
statements of good trade practice. 102
lawful or unlawful practices were understood to be informative rather than
10 3
legislative in character, but they purported to set forth legal requirements.
In 1955 the Commission began to use other advisory pronouncements of a
04
which it
general nature, originally prepared as guides to staff members,
could issue without prior proceedings or after such consultation or hearings
as it might find desirable. 10 5 These pronouncements became a significant ele106
ment in efforts to secure widespread compliance with the statutes.
In 1962 the Federal Trade Commission instituted a program for the use
from time to time of Trade Regulation Rules which would possess a greater,
but not clearly defined, legal force. 10 7 The rule-making procedures prescribed
by Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act were to be followed in preparing these Rules. 0 s An important instance of resort to Trade Regulation
Rules was the formulation of regulations requiring the labeling and advertising
making power on the Commission, but it is probable that the power contained in the

Federal Trade Commission Act, like the investigatory power similarly conferred, extends
to the Commission's functions under the Clayton Act as well. See FTC v. Tuttle, 244
F.2d 605 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 925 (1957) ; FTC v. Reed, 243 F.2d 308 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957) ; Menzies v. FTC, 242 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 957 (1957).
102. See generally H. SELECT CoMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, ANTITRUST LAW ENFORCEMENT BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE ANTITRUST

DIVISION OF THE

H.R. REP. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 30-34 (1951) ; TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 76th CONG., 3d SESS.,
DEPARTMENT OF JUsTIcE-A PRELIMINARY REPORT,

CONTROL OF UNFAIR COMPETITIVE PRACTICES THROUGH TRADE PRACTICE CONFERENCE
PROCEDURE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 4-6 (Monograph No. 34, 1941) ; Handler,

Unfair Competition,21 IowA L. REv. 175, 253-255 (1936); Kittelle & Mostow, A Review
of the Trade Practice Conferences of the Federal Trade Commission, 8 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 427 (1940); Development in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv.
1005, 1088-1091 (1967).
103. See Handler, supra note 102; 16 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1968).
104. Baum & Baker, Enforcement, Voluntary Compliance, and the Federal Trade
Commission, 38 IND. L.J. 322, 351 (1963); Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission:
Internal Organization and Procedure, 48 MINN. L. REV. 383, 452 (1964); Dissenting
Statement of Commissioner Reilly in Devcon Corp., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. IEp. ff 17,791, at 23,153 (FTC 1966). See Appendix B to cigarette advertising Trade

Regulation Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8374 (1964).
105. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.5, 1.6 (1968).
106. Baum & Baker, supra note 104, at 351-353. Commissioner Elman contended at

one point that they were as important and effective as more formally promulgated regulations and should require the same procedures before their issuance. See Dissenting Statement in Devcon Corp., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,791, at 23,150
(FTC 1966).
107. Baum & Baker, supra note 104, at 353-55. The regulation of the Commission
stating the effect of a Trade Regulation Rule provides that in adjudicative proceedings
the Commission "may rely upon the rule" to resolve an issue to which it is relevant,
"provided that the respondent shall have been given a fair hearing on the applicability of
the rule to the particular case." 16 C.F.R. § 1.12(c) (1968).
108. 16 C.F.R. § 1.11 (1968).
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of cigarettes to give adequate warning of the health hazards of smoking. In an
elaborate statement of the basis and purpose of such regulations, the Commission announced that the rules would be regarded in future complaint proceedings against alleged violators as having settled the matters they determined,
leaving the respondent an opportunity to show that his conduct should be
exempted. 10 9 The validity and force of these regulations were not tested because they were superseded by an act of Congress which dealt directly with
cigarette labeling and advertising. In enacting the statute Congress was careful to provide that nothing in it should "be construed.., to affirm or deny the
Federal Trade Commission's holding that it has the authority to issue trade
regulation rules.""n 0
The Federal Trade Commission issued other Trade Regulation Rules
covering deceptive practices under the Federal Trade Commission Act."'
After stating its intention to proceed similarly with regard to vertical mergers
in the cement industry in relation to Section 7 of the Clayton Act,11 2 the Commission substituted an inquiry, including hearings, into relevant aspects of the
industry in order to "help the Commission decide questions of law, policy, and
discretion."'1 3 As7a result, instead of Trade Regulation Rules, it issued a statement of "enforcement policy with respect to" such mergers."14 The statement
specified conditions in local cement markets that would militate against the
legality of vertical mergers in those markets and would cause complaints to
be issued, but it noted at the same time "that the issues in any proceeding instituted by the Commission will be decided on the merits of that case." '
The Federal Trade Commission did not state whether Trade Regulation
Rules might thereafter be undertaken with reference to other matters arising
under the Clayton Act. The rules of practice of the Commission, which were
subsequently revised, continued to provide broadly for Trade Regulation Rules
to be issued after procedures identical to those for the legislative rules the
Commission is empowered to make. 116 In contrast, "Industry Guides" may
be issued after informal proceedings or none at all. The answer to whether
the Commission under its general rule-making power conferred by the Fed109. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8371-73 (1964).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (Supp. III 1968).
111. See 16 C.F.R. ch. I, subch. D (1968).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). See Permanente Cement Co., [1963-1965 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. "16,885 (FTC 1964) ; Elman, Rulemaking Procedures in the
FTC's Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78 HARv. L. REv. 385 (1964). Elman, a member
of the Federal Trade Commission, described the purpose of Trade Regulation Rule proceedings to be the provision of a framework of facts and standards, "within which the
probable legality of prospective mergers could be measured quickly and with a fair degree
of certainty." Id. at 390.
113. 31 Fed. Reg. 6285, 7772 (1966).
114. Jan. 3, 1967, not published in the Federal Register, but included as an appendix
to the report of Lehigh Portland Cement Co., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE Ra.
REP. 1 17,845 (FTC 1967) (appendix at 1 TRADE REG. REP. 14510 (1968)).
115. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
1117,845, at 23,209 (FTC 1967).
116. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.15, 1.16 (1968).
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eral Trade Commission Act can issue regulations that will be binding in subsequent complaint proceedings, so as to exclude the issues they determine from
later adjudicatory hearings, may differ as between that Act and the Clayton
Act, or may vary under each act according to the subject matter. Variations
in the language of the enforcement provisions of the two statutes probably are
not significant. From a practical standpoint, the Federal Trade Commission
Act embraces some matters, such as certain kinds of disclosure requirements
in advertising, exemplified by the cigarette rules, which do not require variation of the Commission's action from case to case. Other matters, including
many in the area of trade restraints and monopolistic practices, to which each
statute or both together may apply,1"' seem to require particularized judgments
which the statute intends shall link together each situation presented and the
general context in which it arises. The legality of a corporate acquisition or
merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act seems to belong in this latter
category, as the Commission appears to have recognized.
The opinion in the Texaco case recognizes that the replacement of adjudication by rule-making pursuant to a general statutory authorization to
issue regulations may not be valid with respect to some kinds of determinations. The Court noted that the regulations there involved "do not pass on the
merits of any rate structure nor on the merits of a certificate of public convenience and necessity; they merely prescribe qualifications for applicants.""'
This distinction is far from clear for the regulations dealt with the practices,
not the qualifications, of applicants, and they did affect rates. A regulation
which, on the basis of the usual rulemaking procedure, set a uniform rate of
return to be applied in determining just and reasonable rates for natural gas,
would raise a new kind of question.
In addition to the types of determinations to be made, the structure of
the statute which is being applied and the consequences to affected persons of
failure on their part to comply with particular agency requirements are important in determining whether regulations authorized only by a general rulemaking power may be used in laying down such requirements. In all of the
117. Sections 2, 3, and 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 18 (1964) prohibit

price and other discrimination in the marketing of goods, exclusive dealing and tying
arrangements, and corporate acquisitions or mergers, where (as to most of the practices
covered) the effect may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits "unfair
methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in interstate and
foreign commerce. The first of these two clauses embraces trade restraints and monopolistic practices which threaten competition, as well as marketing methods which are
injurious to competition. Were it not for the more specific provisions of the Clayton Act,
many of the matters which that Act covers might have been found illegal under the
Federal Trade Commission Act, as other anti-competitive practices have been. The
Commission has employed § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to prohibit practices
closely related to those which § 2 of the Clayton Act renders illegal. American News Co.
v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962); Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.
1962). The necessity of judging business conduct in relation to its effects on competition
consequently may arise under both statutes.
118. 377 U.S. at 42.
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instances which have been reviewed, the consequences of inability or failure
to satisfy a challenged regulation have been loss or failure to obtain a license
or liability to issuance of a cease and desist order, backed by contempt process
or penal sanctions. Violation of recently proposed regulations of the Food and
Drug Administration dealing with sanitation in the manufacture of food products would, if the regulations became mandatory, subject the violator to criminal conviction for breach of the statute which the rules amplified. A different
judicial interpretation or jury application of the statute would be foreclosed.
The regulation would be authorized only by the power to "promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement" of the Act. No means of enforcement for
the regulations as such is provided. Other regulations, specifically authorized
by the same statute, are enforceable by means which the statute specifies. In
such a context, the use of regulations to spell out with binding effect the
criminally enforceable statutory provisions would seem anomalous.110
Some of the CATV regulations of the Federal Communications Commission involved in the Southwestern Cable decision strain the statute more than
others. Microwave carriers that are licensed to transmit programs to CATV
systems are required to take part in securing compliance with the regulations
by the unlicensed systems they serve or wish to serve. Common carriers are
required to serve only such systems as have filed with them written statements
that specified notices of proposed operations have been given to broadcasters
in the areas in which the systems will be located, and that the systems will
abide by the regulations for local program carriage, exclusivity for such programs, and authorization by the Commission for bringing outside programs
into any of the 100 largest television markets. 120 Non-common carrier microwave enterprises must see to it that the CATV systems they serve comply
with the same regulations. 121 Disputes that may arise between broadcasters
and CATV systems concerning compliance may be referred to the Commission by microwave common carriers as well as by the immediate parties,
and the carrier is thereby relieved of obligation in the matter.12 These indirect means of enforcement are somewhat anomalous when considered against
the background of a statute which specifies direct sanctions to secure compliance by those whom it subjects specifically to the Commission's authority.' 2 3
119. Cf. Forte, The GMP Regulations and the Proper Scope of FDA Rule-Making

Authority,-56 Gno. L.J. 688 (1968).

120. 47 C.F.R. 8§ 21.712(a)-(i), 21.712(k), 21.714 (1968).

121. 47 C.F.R §8 91.559, 91.561 (1968).
122. 47 C.F.R. § 21.712(i) (1968).

123. The statutory means of enforcement are license revocation and non-renewal, as

well as cease and desist orders against the licensee's failure "to operate substantially as
set forth in a license" and against his continued violation of the regulations, 47 U.S.C.
§ 312 (1964), together with criminal penalties, 47 U.S.C. § 502 (1964), and fines against
broadcasters, 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1964). Commission action sought by an applicant may
of course be withheld on account of his noncompliance with a legal requirement. Common
carriers are under a duty not to render service knowingly to customers who would use
it to violate the criminal laws. Tracy v. Southern Bell Telephone Co., 37 F. Supp. 829
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The Commission regards the indirect scheme of enforcement as temporary, at
least as respects common carriers, until it is satisfied that penal sanctions and
cease and desist order processes, applicable directly to the CATV systems, will
124
suffice.
The CATV regulations as a whole are analogous substantively to the
provisions of the Communications Act. The authorizations which systems in
the 100 largest television markets must obtain if they desire to import programs are similar to the licensing of broadcasting stations,' 25 new common
carrier wire service, 126 and other users of the radio spectrum. 27 The rules for
the operation of CATV systems are not unlike the restrictions which broadcasters must observe, especially those relating to time sharing, program arrangements, and rebroadcasting. 128 Procedurally the Commission's provision
29
for non-record, informal processes in relief and disputes proceedings1 is an
innovation in the statute, but need not operate differently from the informal
methods which typically precede or dispense with record-type hearings. 3 0
Formal processes follow when the Commission so determines. 131
The moratorium on rate increases, contained in the Permian Basin order,
similarly presents problems of adjustment to the statutory context. It sub2
stitutes its rule, mitigated only slightly by a tortuous means of relief, 8 for the
(S.D. Fla. 1940); Hamilton v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 34 F. Supp. 928 (N.D.
Ohio 1940). The Federal Communications Commission has, also, been sustained in
refusing a cqrtificate to a microwave operator for microwave transmissions to a CATV
enterprise, the operation of which was found not to be in the public interest because
it would have adverse competitive effects on broadcasters. Carter Mountain Transmission
Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). See also FPC
v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 365 U.S. 1 (1961), and note 165 infra. By contrast, the affairs of even licensees themselves, which have no effect upon the aspects
of the licensees' business that are subject to regulation, cannot be governed by the
regulator. Regents of the University System of Georgia v. Carroll, 338 U.S. 586 (1950) ;
cf. FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954). The current CATV regulations deal, of course, with matters that do have an impact on the policies which were
involved in the Carter Mountain case; but the use of licensees as a channel of control,
not over their own affairs but over others', is a new way-to carry out these policies.
124. CATV Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 766-67 (1966).
125. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307-11 (1964).
126. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1964).
127. See note 123 supra; 47 C.F.R. Parts 21, 23, 74, 89-99 (1968).
128. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.71-73.139, 73.281-73.300, 73.561-73.598, 73.651-73.679 (1968).
129. 47 C.F.R. §§ 21.712(j), 74.1109 (1968).
130. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(c), 555(b) (Supp: III 1968).
131. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1109 (1968).
132. This means of relief requires petitioning the Commission for higher rates. Action
by the Commission would await the outcome of the proceeding thus begun. The Supreme
Court declined to sanction the requirement imposed by the court below, Skelly Oil Co. v.
FPC, 375 F.2d 6, 36 (10th Cir. 1967), that the Commission stay its principal order pending action on petitions for relief. 390 U.S. at 773-74. The Court referred to the Commission's discretion to modify or set aside an order in whole or in part under § 19(a), (c)
of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(a), (c) as a possible means of avoiding undue
hardship to producers. That authority continues, by the terms of the statute, until an
order has become final or, after a timely petition for review has been filed, until the
administrative record has been lodged in court. The Commission has authority to prescribe
the date and the manner in which its orders shall become effective. 15 U.S.C. § 717o
(1964). In the principal Permian Basin order it provided that "[n]otwithstanding the
issuance of this final order, these proceedings shall remain open for such further action
as may be necessary with respect to individual respondents and such other action as may
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individual adjudications upon rates which could otherwise have taken place
under the statute. It seems reasonably justified if the across-the-board rates
it was designed to protect were validly determined. To permit increases in
those rates to be sought immediately by the normal statutory means might
have precipitated a flood of applications that would in effect have reopened
the whole vast proceeding. There was no reason to think that economic change
affecting gas prices would be so rapid as to invalidate the results of that proceeding during the moratorium period. Yet individual producers were deprived
of opportunities which the statute seemed to secure. It may be significant that
the second area rate order, issued three years later, did not contain a similar
3
provision.1 3
The proximate cause of potential hardship to some producers was,
however, the fixation of uniform prices rather than the provision which kept
these prices in effect for a relatively short period of time. The crucial question
in the case was whether the determination of uniform prices based mainly on
average-cost figures was a valid method of rate-fixing.
It could hardly be contended that the administrative determination of
uniform prices for natural gas as a commodity, had it been directed by Congress, would not be a valid means of economic regulation. It would be valid
even though individual sellers of gas might be forced out of business because
their properly incurred costs were higher than the prices allowed, provided
these prices were based on a rational gauging of relevent factors.1' 4 This
method was urged by Mr. Justice Jackson in the Hope Natural Gas case,
which involved a pipeline. 13 The majority of the Supreme Court, however,
declined to apply it in that case. Instead they followed the view that the rates
of a natural gas company, as of other utilities, should be so regulated as to
meet the financial needs of the company, including an adequate return on investment. The Federal Power Commission, after the failure of its attempts to
handle a large volume of single-company proceedings, applied the same principle to the large group of producers in the Permian Basin proceeding as a
unit, as the Supreme Court in the intervening case of Wisconsin v. Federal
be necessary in the premises." L, 34 F.P.C. at 243. It seems problematical whether this
provision preserves a continuing power to modify the order, as distinguished from the
power to supersede it by later final orders, including orders granting relief. Cf. CAB v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961). In its opinion the Commission stated that the
interim relief available to a petitioning producer would consist of permission to discontinue service temporarily, if the rate permitted by the order failed to meet out-of-pocket
expenses. Id. at 180, 227.
133. Area Rate Proceeding, CCH UTIL. L. REP. (2d ed.) 1 10,983 at 13,611 (FPC
1968).
134. The PermianBasin opinion, citing earlier cases, asserts the validity of imposing
maximum prices, or price ceilings, "upon commercial and other activities." In this connection "legislatures and administrative agencies may calculate rates for a regulated class
without first evaluating the separate financial position of each member of the class ....
390 U.S. at 769.
135. FPC. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 628 (1944) (separate opinion).
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Power Commission had indicated it might properly attempt to do.138 Costs
vary enormously among gas producers because of differing experience in exploration, in the productivity of wells, and in the quality of gas discovered.
Hence the profitability of uniform rates will also be spread over an extremely
wide range, from large losses to rich rewards. To avoid such consequences,
while remaining within the framework of pricing according to costs and without returning to the morass of individual-company pricing, would require that
costs and rates be determined for subgroups of producers with similar experience. The Commission, however, used average costs of producing new gas in
1960, ascertained on a national basis, which it found to be sufficiently realistic
for the area, and Permian Basin area-wide costs of gas from wells brought in
earlier, 137 in fixing rates for the entire group. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting,
expressed strongly the view that an average-cost figure could not be sufficiently
representative of actuality in widely varying individual instances. 138 The majority, in mitigation of this and other deficiencies in the data, accepted the
Commission's contention that future adjustments would suffice to achieve
fuller compliance with the statutory standard of justness and reasonableness
of rates.'3 9 The Commission, in short, having by its order made significant
progress toward satisfying the statute, is permitted to attempt to make further
progress by refining its methods.
IV. LIITS To NoN-LEGISLATIVE LEGISLATION
The extensions of agency authority which the Supreme Court has sanctioned in the Permian Basin and Southwestern Cable decisions involve larger
issues than those of adjustment to the statutory context and appropriateness
of decisional method. These larger issues concern ways of shaping national
policy in the utilization of new physical resources and advancing technology.
They also involve basic questions of the relation of agencies and courts on the
one hand and to the legislature on the other.
The allocation of natural gas, coal, and oil as energy sources for use now
and in the future turns in part on the prices at which gas is allowed to be sold.
The continued dominance of advertiser-supported, free-to-the-viewer television
in the nation's homes may depend to a significant extent on protection from
the intrusions of wired service. As to both matters, the controls initiated by
both the agencies and the courts currently play a decisive role. They are at136. 373 U.S. 294, 309-10 (1963).
137. 390 U.S. at 761-64, 799-803, 815. The Commission gave supplementary weight

to noncost factors, such as the effects of prices on exploration and supply and the expecta-

tions of producers based on earlier policy statements of the Commission. Id. at 791, 795,
797, 799, 815. See Kitch, The Per nian Basin Area Rate Cases and the Regulatory Deternination of Price, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 191 (1967), commenting on the Commission's
methods.

138. 390 U.S. at 829-37.

139. 390 U.S. at 772, 789, 792, 795, 817, 822.
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tended by significant delays, uncertainties, and costs. Neither set of measures
has as yet resulted in stability; the road of further experimentation by agencies
and courts still lies ahead. Yet disruption and chaos in the two industries have
been avoided and, at least, the, felt needs and desires of consumers have been
met at relatively low cost.
Whether the consequences of such measures are good in the long run
cannot be determined adequately by their conformity to past legislative intention or by the degree of internal consistency in the resulting agency methods
and policies. Legislative history played little role in the Philips Petroleum
decision which brought about the regulation of independent natural gas
producers' sales in interstate commerce. 140 If the decision had been based on
congressional intent, the'result would have been the opposite of what it was, 141
but not -necessarily better for the country. As to CATV, which was unknown
at the time the Communications Act was adopted, there could not have been
a specific legislative intent. The Supreme Court's 'effort to demonstrate an
actual congressional purpose to apply the Act to all future forms of radio and
wire communication does not carry conviction.J 42 Again, however, the absence
of a specific legislative intent to authorize the extension of agency authority
does not prove that the decision sustaining the extension was wrong. Other
criteria of statutory interpretation, which the Court also used, may support
the decision. These include the literal meaning of the words of the statute, en140. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
141. Cf. id. at 690-96 (Clark and Burton, JJ., dissenting). Excerpts from the legislative history appear in the opinion of the Court in FPC v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line
Co., 337 U.S. 498, 509-13 (1949). There, however, the issue relating to Federal Power
Commission authority over alienation of gas reserves previously owned by pipeline companies was quite different.
142. The Southwestern Cable opinion relies particularly on passages from the Senate
committee report supporting passage of the Communications Act of 1934 and on words
from a sentence in a message of 'President Roosevelt urging creation of the Communications Commission, which is quoted in the corresponding House report. 392 U.S. at 168
nn. 26-28; id. at 172.' These statements advocate a "single Government agency" with
"unified jurisdiction" and "broad authority" over "all forms of electrical communication."
Read in the context of a proposal to combine in one agency the previous authority of the
Radio Commission over the use of the radio spectrum and of the Interstate Commerce
Commission over common carriers of communications by wire, and in the absence of
specific references to the regulation of other existing or future forms of eldctrical communication, the statements do not lend support to an expansive interpretation of the Act.
Neither the Commission nor the Court makes reference to the origin of § 303(r) of the
Communications Act, the rule-making provision which is one of the two provisions principally relied'upon as bestowing the means of implementing the Commission's "broad
authority." This subsection was introduced into the Act in 1937 by legislation to promote

safety at sea, 50 Stat. 189, 191, 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1964). It is highly unlikely that Con-

gress intended at that time to introduce into the Communications Act, without express
recognition that it was doing so, a sweeping provision for carrying out broad powers previously given to the Commission. -It is also of some significance that Congress in the
original Act dealt specifically with a known instance of impact of wire services on broadcasting, instead of leaving it to be regulated under the broad authority which was later
found in the statute. Section 202(b), 48 Stat. 1070 (1934), provides for regulation of
charges and services "in connection with the use of common carrier wires in chain broadcasting" or in other radio communication. (Amended in 1960, 74 Stat. 888, 47 U.S.C.
J 202(b) (1964), to include common-carrier radio service, such as microwave, in the
provision.)
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largement of statutory provisions to include situations analogous to those
specifically covered, and extension of the statute to effectuate its purpose more
fully.
There seems little doubt that the decisive factor in the PhillipsPetroleum
decision was the Supreme Court's belief, which later was made explicit, that
the effectuation of the public interest which the Natural Gas Act was designed
to protect required the establishment of the Federal Power Commission's authority to regulate sales in interstate commerce by independent gas producers.
The Federal Communications Commission made the same kind of determination when it extended its authority to cover CATV systems. The difficulties
and costs of the Natural Gas Act extension were not foreseen at the time, nor
could possible alternatives outside the contours of the statute be fully explored
in either instance. By the action that was taken, each agency was launched
upon a program of innovation which, despite its boldness, remained of necessity within the established regulatory framework. Both the procedural and
the substantive innovations to follow may depart further from established patterns, but are not likely to veer in entirely new directions. The Federal Power
Commission, for example, can hardly set across-the-board just and reasonable
natural gas rates entirely by means of rule-making without the participation
of buyers and sellers who exercise the procedural rights of parties to adjudications. 143 Neither is the Commission in a position to conclude, as Congress
might, that it should approve all contract prices for gas which reflect arm'slength bargaining. 144 Similarly, the Federal Communications Commission will
hardly reverse its course by electing to entrust the public interest in homereception television to competition between quasi-monopolistic local broadcasters, still restricted and protected in relation to each other, and locally
franchised CATV enterprises 145 which might possibly be required to pay fees
4
to the originators of the programs they transmitted. "
143. Price- and wage-fixing for large numbers of enterprises is traditionally carried

on in this fashion, but the Natural Gas Act provides too clearly for individual-company
proceedings in the fixing of rates for these processes to be altogether displaced.
144. Whatever may now be said of the holding in City of Detroit v. FPC, 230 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956), that costs must remain the primary factor

in determining the amount to be allowed to a pipeline company for natural gas it produces

for itself, so as to serve the public interest in just and reasonable prices when the market
might yield more, there is continuing validity to the principal point in the opinion, that
the Commission must explicitly formulate a judgment that the specific prices allowed,
not whatever the market may yield, will serve the primary aim of the Act: to guard
the consumer against excessive rates. 230 F.2d at 815-19.
145. Franchising by local governments results from the necessity for permission
to string CATV wires along public rights of way. It may have restrictive consequences
for competition in the CATV aspect of television, similar to those which result on the
broadcasting side from federal regulation.
146. The Federal Communications Commission has alluded to the unfairness of
competition between broadcasters who must pay for local program rights and CATV
services which not only invade their markets but do so without having to make similar
payments. Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 703-06 (1965); CATV
Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 778-81 (1966). The Supreme Court has

removed the possibility that, without legislation, payments might have to be made by
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Such radical changes of policy may, of course, be made by statute. Nothing that has been done by the agencies and courts has deprived Congress of
its authority to legislate as it sees fit concerning these matters. The decisions
and actions which have taken place can be viewed as measures of an essentially
interim nature-the best that could be devised by those charged with responsibility, but subject to replacement whenever the legislature can prescribe
better and more permanent solutions. The Federal Power Commission endorsed legislation to alter its mandate for several years after the Phillips
Petroleum decision.1 47 The Federal Communications Commission, after vainly
seeking legislative guidance, 48 has expressed its concern not to give the appearance of foreclosing legislation by the actions it has felt called upon to
49

take.1

Actualities in the continuing interplay between legislative measures and
administrative and judicial actions complicate their relationships considerably,
however. Legislative inertia and the difficulty of enacting statutes in the face
of clashing interests are powerful forces. They support the status quo whether
it be long established or newly created. Decisions not to extend regulatory
power because of new developments tend to preserve non-regulation for indefinite periods. If an agency's existing powers are inadequate, it must then
continue its work under the handicap of restricted ability to fulfill its purposes.
Decisions to extend agency authority without new legislation, such as those
under review here, create circumstances which, to a similar extent, are likely
to continue. In addition, the interests that are benefited by a new administraCATV enterprises for their use of copyrighted material included in programs. Fort-

nightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968). Seemingly it is

still open to the Commission to require that CATV systems pay to the broadcasting
stations or program originators, whose programs they use, reasonable sums for program
rights, with or without a privilege in the sellers of these rights to withhold them altogether.
Such a requirement without a privilege in the seller to withhold would involve great
difficulties of determining suitable payments in individual instances, probably necessitating
arbitration when agreement failed. If the privilege to withhold programs from CATV
were given, program originators would be able to confer exclusive local rights on either
broadcasting or CATV enterprises.
147. 35 FPC ANN. REP. 176-77 (1955); 36 FPC ANN. REP. 19 (1956); 37
FPC ANNz. REP. 25-26 (1957); 40 FPC ANN. REP. 17 (1960).
148. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 164-65 (1968).
149. "In taking these actions, we have stressed our awareness that legislative action
by the Congress in this area is both possible and desirable. We have moved to deal with
the overall problem of CATV in a manner which we think will allow us to be most
helpful to the Congress and at the same time give us the maximum flexibility to act
where action is needed." Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 685 (1965).
"We therefore state again that we would welcome congressional guidance as to policy
and congressional clarification in all respects in this field." CATV Second Report and
Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 787 (1966). Legislation of some sort is likely to take place in any
event, if only to provide specifically for the copyright aspects of CATV relaying. Rapidly
advancing technology, generating powerful conflicting interests, may require a nev
legislative start on the CATV problem as a whole, despite the Commission's best efforts.
For summaries of recent and potential future developments, see Barnett & Greenberg,
A Proposal for Wired City Television, 1968 WAsir. U.L.Q. 1; Cox, Competition In, and
Ainwng the Broadcasting, CATV, and Pay-TV Industries, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 911
(1968) ; Jones, Use and Regulation of the Radio Spectrum: Report on a Conference 1968
WASH. U.L.Q. 71; Proposed Rule Making, F.C.C., 33 Fed. Reg. 19028 (Dec. 20, 1968).
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tive or judicial development acquire addef strength in subsequent legislative
consideration of the problems involved. The principal bills to overcome the
effects of Phillips Petroleum, for example, did not take the form of simple
withdrawal of the authority newly bestowed on the Federal Power Commission. The next Congress, instead of focusing on such a measure,- 50 sought to
prescribe different methods and policies for the Commission to follow. 151 The
bill which was passed by both houses but vetoed by President Eisenhower
because of improprieties in the lobbying which accompanied its passage would
have restricted the Commission to disallowing future excessive purchase prices
of gas by pipeline companies in setting the rates these companies might charge.
It would also have required that market factors, instead of producers' costs, be
the basis of the prices fixed.152- The leading proposal in the next Congress
would have retained direct control by the Commission over producers' subsequent prices, but have substituted market-price for cost-based price-fixing
standards. 153 Had any of these measures been enacted, the Supreme Court's
Phillips decision would still have bad permanent consequences which, without
the decision, might never have arisen. 5 4
The crucial long-term issue for agencies and courts when similar prob150. The struggle over regulation of independent producers' natural gas sales was
one of the legislative "battles of the century." Before Phillips, the Kerr bill, passed by
both houses but vetoed by President Truman, 96 CONG. REc. 5304-05 (1950), would have
excluded such sales specifically from regulation. Similar bills were introduced after
Phillips,but were not reported out of committee, 35 FPC ANN. REP. 177-78 (1955).
151. 35 FPC ANN. REP. 177 (1955). Such proposals can be viewed either as a way of
escape from effective regulation or as a means of more realistic regulation which could
take account of some or all of the factors stressed by Mr. Justice Jackson in his Hope
Natural Gas opinion, 320 U.S. 591, 628 (1944). See the House debate, 101 CONG. IEC.
11855-930 (1955), and that in the Senate, 102 CONG. REc. 1461-88, 1653-1716, 1949-2096
(1956).
152. 35 FPC ANN. REP. 177 (1955). As to the veto see 102 CONG. REc. 2897 (1956);
H.R. Doc. 342, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
153. The bill, H.R. 6790, is reproduced in Hearings on H.R. 6790, 6791 and Related
Bills before the H. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-11 (1957),
and is summarized in 37 FPC ANN. REp. 17-18 (1957), and ABA MINERAL & NATURAL
REsouRcEs L. SEcTioN, REP. Cosmm. oN NATURAL GAS (1957 Proceedings) 75-77.
154. If it were inclined to do so, the Federal Power Commission could possibly, under
its new freedom, apply the principles of the 1957 bill in exercising its present authority
to prescribe just and reasonable rates, instead of continuing the area method. In the
PermianBasin opinion the Supreme Court was at pains to state first, that the Commission
is "free, within the limitations imposed by pertinent constitutional and statutory commands,
to devise methods of regulation capable of equitably reconciling diverse and conflicting
interests," 390 U.S. at 767; second, that in the Hope case the Court had "emphasized
that we may not impose methods of regulation upon the discretion of the Commission,"
id. at 775; and third, that in FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942),
the Court had "repudiated... the suggestion that courts may properly require the Commission to employ any particular regulatory formula or combination of formulae," 390
U.S. at 775. Commissioner O'Connor, concurring except on a secondary point in the
Permian Basin case, contended that the effect of the Commission's order was the same
as would have resulted from avowedly making market prices, checked as to reasonableness by their consequences in eliciting supply and by "composite costs," the basis of
decision; and he expressed the hope that this view "will become the rule." 34 F.P.C. at
243-44. Kitch, supra note 137, concludes that other factors than costs, coinciding conveniently with cost figures that had been modified significantly, were in fact decisive
of the prices contained in the order. If the Supreme Court had taken this view, it would
have had to decide whether rate-fixing based on these alternative factors was valid.
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lems arise is whether, in the light of probable consequences and a sound
relationship of agencies and courts to the legislature, major extensions of regulatory authority should be undertaken without action by the legislature. The
Permian Basin and Southwestern Cable decisions in this respect go beyond
the most advanced principles of statutory construction that have been formulated. They exceed reasoning by analogy from situations previously covered,
both because they launch new processes and because the economic reasoning
on which they rest requires testing by considerations beyond the statute.
The conception Charles Curtis expressed with respect to statutory interpretation is of a discretion residing in those who apply a flexible statute, to
adapt it to new circumstances instead of searching for the hidden intent of an
extinct legislature.15 The scope of that discretion must be set by the competence of those who exercise it to weigh the relevant considerations and by the
availability of means to effectuate the conclusions reached. Friedmann's suggestion that the limits of the extension of statutes by interpretation are reached
when new "institutions" must be created' 50 seems sound for many areas of
law. When, however, an administrative agency is present to develop new
institutions, including procedures and substantive regulations, the limits can
be wider than when established methods of enforcement are the only ones
available. Serving an ultimate statutory purpose may nevertheless require a
choice among major alternatives which an agency, as well as a court, may not
be capable of making. The methods an agency may adopt, moreover, can
involve costs for both the agency' 57 and those subject to its authority, 58 which
155. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407, 415
(1950).
156. Friedmann, Legal Philosophy and Judicial Lawmaking, 61 COLUm. L. REV.
821, 839 (1961). When a court is the interpreter it must act without the "elaborate
procedure of investigation and interpretation" which, as Henry M. Hart, Jr. has pointed
out, a legislature has at its command in fashioning new law. LEaA INSSTUTioNS TODAY
AND TomoRizow, Comment at 40, 46 (M. Paulsen ed. 1959).
157. The agency's costs consist of those necessary to handle the matters coming
before it. The Phillips Petroleum decision of 1954 imposed a totally new burden of
independent producer certificate-application and rate cases on the Federal Power Commission, amounting in the first year to 6,047 applications and 10,978 rate filings. 35 FPC
ANN. REP. 88, 108 (1955). A persistent fiscal year-end backlog of well over 2,000 independent-producer applications still pending, despite disposal of approximately an equal
number during the year, remained from June 30, 1956 (2,980 applications) to at least
the same date in 1962 (2,355 applications). 36 FPC ANN. REP. 79-80 (1956) ; 42 FPC
ANN. REP. 104 (1962). The corresponding backlog of independent-producer rate cases
rose from 274 to 2,939. 36 FPC ANN. REP. 85 (1956) ; 42 FPC ANN. REP. 107 (1962).
The backlog of applications had been reduced to 1,401 by June 30, 1964, but the rate
cases awaiting disposition rose to 3,230. 44 FPC ANN. REP. 145-46 (1964). The corresponding figures for June 30, 1966 were 917 and 3,216. 46 FPC ANN. REP. 157, 159 (1966).
New appropriations for the Commission did not differ significantly from those going to
comparable agencies during the same years. The respective agencies' annual reports show
the following:
1956
F.P.C.
$4,900,000
F.C.C.
7,323,000
F.T.C.
4,548,500
* $145,939 not used because of management improvements.

1966
$13,530,000"
17,338,500
13,671,000
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call for scrutiny by the legislature. Disrepute of the administrative process and
perhaps that of the courts, resulting from delays, uncertainties, and costs
imposed by new burdens, may also be a consequence of extensions of authority
when the extensions are not implemented by legislation. Such was the result,
for a time, of the Phillipsdecision. 159
The Supreme Court's developing doctrine of agency freedom to assume
expanded authority when the attainment of statutory purposes seems to
require it6° was enunciated in the Southwestern Cable case as a matter of
deliberate choice. The Court ignored a narrower basis for the decision, which
Mr. Justice White suggested in his concurring opinion.' 1 The reason for the
Court's choice appears to lie in the belief that an expandable scope of authority,
along with procedural flexibility, is necessary if regulation is to be effective
under today's conditions. There is an obviously sound basis for this view.
Rapidly changing economic and technological forces require resourcefulness
and capacity for change at all levels of government if legal controls are to be
effective. It is also true that, as Mr. Justice Douglas emphasized in his Phillips
FCC functions have expanded because of technological developments, notably television,
and their increased use; those of the FTC have grown because legislation conferring new
duties on the Commission and a heightened sense of the importance of effective regulation
in its areas of concern. FPC expansion has been largely because of the addition to its
jurisdiction brought about by the Phillips decision. Congress did not have an opportunity
to consider whether it wished to authorize the consequent expenditures and future appropriations, as it does when statutes impose new duties.
158. The Court alluded in the Pernian Basin opinion to the costs of regulation to
natural gas producers, amounting in all to 1.1640 per thousand cubic feet of gas during
1956-58. 390 U.S. at 786-87 n.56, citing Gerwig, Natural Gas Production: A Study of
Costs of Regulation, 5 J.L. & Ecom 69 (1962). This amount is between 5% and 10%
of the great bulk of producer prices. Between .0390 and .0780 is attributable to the expense
of participation in regulatory processes, and .8094 to delay caused by those processes.
Gerwig, id. at 86-87. The advent of firm area prices may diminish these costs substantially. The costs necessary to full participation in area rate proceedings, when these
proceedings occur, have a different kind of impact which statistics do not reflect. See
Mossburg, The Permian Decision-A Study in Group Regulation, 19 OxiA. L. REV. 133
(1966). Expert services of economists and statisticians as well as of knowledgeable
lawyers are required to deal, even by way of mere criticism, with the area-wide or
nation-wide collections of data that are used. These services are beyond the means of
any but the wealthiest participants or organizations of smaller participants. The proceedings therefore take on a representative character, contrasting with the processes traditionally available to individual litigants.
159. The Supreme Court in the Permian Basin opinion, 390 U.S. at 758, refers to
Landis' comment, in his 1960 report on the regulatory agencies to President-elect
Kennedy, on the Federal Power Commission's administration of the Natural Gas Act
as the "outstanding example in the federal government of the breakdown of the administrative process."
160. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
161. 392 U.S. at 181. The Communications Act provides in 47 U.S.C. § 303(h) (1964),
that the Commission shall have authority "to establish areas or zones to be served by any
[radio] station," and in 47 U.S.C. § 303(f) (1964), that it may issue regulations "to
prevent interference between stations and to carry out the provisions" of the Act. It also
provides in § 301 (47 U.S.C. § 301 (1964)) that the Commission may regulate "any apparatus for the transmission .. . of communications signals." Protection of the "areas or
zones" of licensed television stations by means of the restrictions contained in the CATV
regulations seems to come well within this authority. If there were doubt about the
applicability of Commission regulations, authorized in this manner, to CATV wire systems, the extension of all the provisions of the Act to all wire communication, 47 U.S.C.
§ 152(a) (1964), would seem to remove it.
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Petroleum dissent' 6 2 and Commissioner Loevinger, dissenting, repeated in the
Federal Communications Commission CATV proceeding, 0 3 only the legislature is competent to undertake certain kinds of legal advances, including
measures necessary to remedy deficiencies in existing statutes under some
conditions. There is no escape from judging each situation as wisely as possible in the light of all relevant factors, including alternatives which do not
lie on the surface of an established scheme of regulation, and of deciding on
this basis whether or not an extension of agency authority should be under64
taken without legislative participation.
The necessity for such highly discretionary decisions, involving large
consequences, creates opportunity for power-grabbing. There is no indication
of a lust for power in the situations under review.1 65 Administrators and
judges, seeking conscientiously to discharge their responsibilities, have sought
to perform their duties effectively, subject to legislative authority, and have
been resourceful in doing so. Error, not deliberate overreaching, is the more
serious danger under these circumstances. If actual abuse at the administrative
level should take place, it would probably be checked by judicial reversal or
new legislation; and action by the legislature to overcome over-bold decisions
by agencies or courts in the construction of statutes is available as well. When
the merits of a particular agency or court determination are less clear, it is
especially likely to endure despite doubts. If it involves major innovation, it
is also likely to be a half-measure, compared to possible new legislation. Hence
reluctance to expand authority greatly without legislative action, on the basis
of vague statutory provisions, is wise.
162. 347 U.S. 672, 690:

Regulation of the business of producing and gathering natural gas involves considerations of which we know little and with which we are not competent to deal.
163. Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 759, 760:
Undoubtedly the independent regulatory agencies have been given great power
and broad discretion in its exercise. But if democratic government is to survive,
the corollary . . . must be a strong impulse of self-restraint in the exercise of
such power . . . If the laws are inadequate to cope with the problems of the
moment, it is the function of Congress to remedy that lack.
164. Cf. M. SHAPRo, THE SuPEmE COURT AND AnMINISTRATiVE AGENCIES 240-41,
244-49 (1968).
165. The conclusion in SuAPnzo, supra note 164, as to the same factor in a related
situation is to the contrary. Concededly the Federal Power Commission does not have
direct jurisdiction over the end uses to which natural gas may be put or the prices at
which gas in the ground may be sold to an ultimate user such as an industrial or
electric power generating concern. A pipeline company wishing to transport gas interstate must, however, secure a certificate of convenience and necessity from the Commission.
In FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961), the Supreme Court
held that the Commission may take both factors into account, when relevant, in deciding
upon the issuance of certificates. Shapiro ably analyzes the contending forces at work in
this situation, including a desire of the Commission and supporting interests to stretch the
Natural Gas Act beyond the bounds of an interpretation which the legislative history will
support, and including also a policy-oriented judiciary which both abets and confines the
agency by psychologically subtle responses. There is much truth in this picture even if,
as this writer thinks, the Commission is less consistently bent on the enlargement of its
authority than Shapiro seems to think and the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Transcontinental case is much more straightforward and sound in its conclusions than Shapiro
apparently believes.
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Such a counsel of prudence does not eliminate the necessity of choice in
difficult situations, but suggests that long-run consequences and alternatives
be weighed with deference and great care. To some degree, significant extensions of agency authority, through the exercise of flexible powers, are inevitable under modem conditions. If not by the strikingly expansive decisions
which have been the subject of this article, then by others of somewhat more
limited scope, the charter of a new Administrative State needed to be fashioned.
The one that has been written reduces administrative and judicial dependence
on legislation far more than was traditional before, and sets highly elastic limits
to authority. A prime task of administrative and judicial statesmanship in the
future will be to judge wisely, situation by situation, where to draw the line
between boldness and caution in exercising the power that now exists.

